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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 
Issa Diallo was arrested and pleaded guilty to 
knowingly possessing 15 or more counterfeit credit cards 
with the intent to defraud. At his sentencing hearing, the 
Government argued that although the actual loss attributed to 
Diallo’s  conduct amounted to $160,000, he should be 
assessed a 16-level enhancement because his intended loss 
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amount was the maximum that he could have charged on the 
credit cards, which was $1.6 million. We agree with Diallo’s 
contention that for the purpose of Section 2B1.1 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, the intended loss of a credit card fraud 
is not, in every case, the credit card’s credit limit. We 
therefore vacate and remand for resentencing.1
 
 
I. 
 
On December 26, 2008, Diallo used a counterfeit 
credit card to purchase 26 gift cards, each valued at $100, at a 
Wegmans Supermarket in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The 
following day, Diallo returned to that supermarket and was 
arrested. At the time of his arrest, Diallo possessed $920 in 
cash, a counterfeit North Carolina driver’s license, and a 
counterfeit credit card. After obtaining a search warrant, the 
Wilkes-Barre Township Police Department searched Diallo’s 
vehicle and recovered 53 counterfeit credit cards, a 
counterfeit Louisiana driver’s license, 24 gift cards, a Global 
Positioning System (GPS), a laptop computer, a thumb drive, 
and a skimming device, which is a hand-held device that 
copies, stores, and encodes credit card information from a 
credit card’s magnetic strip. A subsequent search by Secret 
Service agents resulted in the discovery of a second thumb 
drive and another gift card. Searches of the laptop and thumb 
drives revealed over 200 compromised Discover, Visa, and 
MasterCard credit card accounts. Through a search of the 
GPS device, Secret Service agents also discovered the 
addresses for 12 Wegmans stores, 9 Wawa convenience 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231. This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  
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stores, and 3 7-Eleven convenience stores. Wegmans advised 
agents that during November and December 2008, Diallo had 
been recorded on store surveillance tapes using a fraudulent 
credit card to purchase Visa gift cards at Wegmans stores 
throughout Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New 
York.  
 
During an interview with Secret Service agents, Diallo 
admitted to possessing the compromised credit card numbers 
on his laptop computer and thumb drives. Diallo stated that he 
had received the account information from another individual 
and that he could load the account information onto gift cards 
using the skimming device.  
 
On January 21, 2010, Diallo pleaded guilty to 
knowingly possessing 15 or more counterfeit access devices, 
with intent to defraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3). 
The parties did not agree to a specific loss amount or the 
number of victims and reserved the issue for the sentencing 
hearing. The parties agreed that the sentence would be 
calculated under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, which is the Guideline 
covering fraud offenses. Prior to sentencing, a U.S. Probation 
Officer prepared a presentence report, which calculated a total 
offense level of 27 and criminal history category of I. The 
total offense level included a 16-level enhancement for an 
intended loss amount of over $1 million but not more than 
$2.5 million, which was based on the Secret Service agents’ 
determination of the aggregate credit limit of all of the 
compromised credit card numbers, and a 4-level enhancement 
for over 50 victims, based on the number of financial 
institutions that had issued the credit cards numbers. Diallo 
objected to both enhancements. 
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At Diallo’s sentencing hearing, the Secret Service case 
agent testified that he had determined that there were 52 
victims, consisting of the 51 financial institutions that owned 
the various credit card numbers and Wegmans Corporation. 
The agent also testified that while an actual loss of $160,000 
could be attributed to Diallo, there was “approximately $1.6 
million in potential loss.” App. 15) He calculated this 
potential loss by contacting the 51 financial institutions 
associated with each credit card to request each card’s credit 
limit, and the total credit limit for the 327 credit cards was 
$1.6 million. The agent, however, conceded that an individual 
in possession of a stolen card could not determine its credit 
limit without a subpoena.  
 
At Diallo’s sentencing hearing, the defense argued that 
“intended loss requires knowledge that the loss is a virtual 
certainty,” and that Diallo did not have “that type of guilty 
knowledge as to the amount that was available on these cards 
or that he even had access to these cards.” App. 24. In 
response, the government argued:  
 
[I]ntended loss isn’t necessarily something that 
is certain.  
 
If you can take someone’s credit card, and you 
can charge up to $20,000 on it, that’s the 
intended loss. That is how much you can get if 
you try long and hard enough to get it.  
 
The card will stop when there is nothing 
available any longer, when the credit limit has 
been reached. 
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App. 25.  
 
 The District Court accepted the Government’s 
arguments on Diallo’s intended loss and the number of 
victims, and it overruled Diallo’s objections. The Court’s 
analysis on these two issues consisted of the following: “The 
intended loss for credit cards he personally used and the cards 
he manufactured and provided to others totaled $1.6 million. 
Over 50 financial institutions were affected by his actions. So 
obviously it is a very serious offense.” App. 30-31. The 
District Court then applied both enhancements, resulting in a 
total offense level of 27 and a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 
months’ imprisonment.  
 
After the District Court overruled the objection to the 
intended loss amount enhancement, Diallo argued that a 
departure was warranted. He emphasized the fact that the 
intended loss calculation of $1.6 million is ten times greater 
than the actual loss, and is “a gross overstatement of the 
seriousness of this offense.” App. 28. While the District Court 
declined to depart from the Guidelines range, it ultimately 
sentenced Diallo to a bottom-of-the-Guidelines-range 
sentence of 70 months’ imprisonment.  
 
II. 
 
 On appeal, Diallo challenges the application of the 
same two enhancements to which he objected at his 
sentencing hearing. He maintains that (1) his Guidelines 
range was improperly calculated because of the District 
Court’s determination that intended loss is simply an 
aggregation of the credit limits of stolen credit card numbers, 
despite no evidence that Diallo intended to cause that amount 
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of loss; and (2) the District Court incorrectly increased his 
offense level by four levels based on a finding that there were 
over fifty victims when only thirty victims had suffered an 
actual loss.  
 
 The Government has conceded that the number-of-
victims enhancement is improper because the applicable 
Sentencing Guidelines require that victims must have suffered 
an actual loss, as compared to subsequent Guidelines which 
additionally included individuals “whose means of 
identification [were] used unlawfully or without authority.” 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 app. n.4(E) (effective Nov. 1, 2009); see 
also United States v. Kennedy, 554 F.3d 415, 419 (3d Cir. 
2009) (holding that victims must have suffered an actual 
pecuniary loss); United States v. Corrado, 53 F.3d 620, 622 
(3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the earlier Guidelines control 
when retroactive application of the Guidelines in effect at 
sentencing would result in more severe penalties). As the 
Government has conceded that remand for resentencing on 
this enhancement is appropriate, we will only consider the 
question of Diallo’s intended loss amount.  
 
A. 
 
Section 2B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides 
that the offense level is to be increased based on the loss 
amount for offenses involving fraud, as well as other larceny 
and theft offenses. For offenses resulting in a loss greater than 
$120,000, there is a 10-level increase, and when there is a 
loss greater than $1 million, there is a 16-level increase. 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1). “Loss” is defined as “the greater of 
actual loss or intended loss.” Id. app. n.3(A). “Intended loss” 
is defined as “the pecuniary harm that was intended to result 
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from the offense[] and includes intended pecuniary harm that 
would have been impossible or unlikely to occur (e.g., as in a 
government sting operation, or an insurance fraud in which 
the claim exceeded the insured value).” Id. app. n.3(A)(ii). In 
estimating loss, the application notes advise, “[t]he court need 
only make a reasonable estimate of the loss. The sentencing 
judge is in a unique position to assess the evidence and 
estimate the loss based upon that evidence. For this reason, 
the court’s loss determination is entitled to appropriate 
deference.” Id. app. n.3(C). This appeal requires us to 
determine how sentencing courts should calculate what 
“pecuniary harm was intended to result” from credit card 
fraud when the fraud’s perpetrator did not know the credit 
limit, which is the potential loss amount from the stolen credit 
card.  
 
As we have not yet addressed this question, the parties 
urge us to consider extra-Circuit authority to determine how 
to calculate intended loss in a credit card fraud. Diallo asks 
the Court to adopt the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in 
United States v. Manatau, 647 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2011). In 
Manatau, the Tenth Circuit stated that “‘intended loss’ means 
a loss the defendant purposely sought to inflict. ‘Intended 
loss’ does not mean a loss that the defendant merely knew 
would result from his scheme or a loss he might have possibly 
and potentially contemplated.” Id. at 1050 (emphasis in 
original). The Court looked at the plain language and context 
of the Guideline and background legal norms, and it held that 
“a court cannot simply calculate ‘intended loss’ by toting up 
credit limits without any finding that the defendant intended 
to inflict a loss reasonably approaching those limits.” Id. at 
1056-57. The Government, however, cites cases from the 
Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, that it contends support 
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its view that aggregating the total credit limit is the proper 
method to calculate intended loss. See United States v. 
Harris, 597 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Bonanno, 146 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Staples, 410 F.3d 484 (8th Cir. 2005). However, all of these 
cases are distinguishable from the facts before us as the cases 
involved either defendants who recklessly transferred the 
credit information to a third party, thereby placing the full 
potential loss at risk, or defendants who had knowledge of 
and actually intended the maximum potential loss.  
While we have not specifically considered how to 
estimate the intended loss of a credit card fraud, we have 
addressed how intended loss should be calculated under 
analogous circumstances where the defendant had not 
necessarily expected to capture the full potential loss. As with 
other sentencing enhancements, we employ a burden-shifting 
framework to establish that an enhancement applies. 
“[T]hough the government bears the burden of proof in 
guidelines cases, the burden of production may shift to the 
defendant once the government presents prima facie evidence 
of a given loss figure.” United States v. Geevers, 226 F.3d 
186, 188 (3d Cir. 2000). However, the government always 
bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the facts support a sentencing enhancement, and 
“the defendant does not have to prove the negative to avoid 
the enhanced sentence.” United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 
245, 253 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 
We looked at how sentencing courts should calculate 
intended loss in United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 
1991). In Kopp, the district court sentenced the defendant 
based on the full value of the bank loan that his fraudulent 
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misrepresentation had secured, rather than determining the 
victim-bank’s actual loss or evaluating the defendant’s claim 
that he intended to repay the loan. Id. at 525-26. We rejected 
a “[m]echanical application of the theft guidelines in fraud 
cases” and remanded the case after finding that the district 
court made no findings on actual or intended loss. Id. at 529, 
536. We cautioned that the fraud Guideline “has never 
endorsed sentencing based on the worst-case scenario 
potential loss” and admonished sentencing courts to consider 
actual or intended harm. Id. at 529 (emphasis in original). To 
make this determination, we look to the “defendant’s 
subjective expectation, not to the risk of loss to which he may 
have exposed his victims.” United States v. Yeaman, 194 F.3d 
442, 460 (3d Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, “[w]hile intended loss 
may not be automatically determinable based on what the 
potential loss is, intended loss may still equal potential loss.” 
Geevers, 226 F.3d at 192. However, the Geevers Court 
cautioned, “[i]t is clear that a district court errs when it simply 
equates potential loss with intended loss without deeper 
analysis.” Id. 
 
Geevers involved a check kiting scheme, whereby 
Geevers had opened numerous bank accounts by depositing 
checks from closed accounts or accounts with insufficient 
funds and then attempted to withdraw some of the funds 
before the victim bank realized the checks were not backed. 
Id. at 188-89. Geevers had deposited checks with face values 
of $2 million, had attempted to withdraw or transfer about 
$400,000, and had managed to withdraw or transfer over 
$160,000. Id. at 189. The government argued that the 
intended loss amount was the total face value of the deposited 
checks. Id. Geevers, however, argued that it was not his 
intention to steal the total face value of the checks and that he 
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could not have possibly successfully withdrawn that amount. 
Id. at 189-90. We found Geevers’s contention of impossibility 
irrelevant, noting “impossibility does not require a sentencing 
court to lower its calculation of intended loss.” Id. at 195. 
Instead, the Court found that even though it was likely that 
Geevers did “not expect to obtain the full amount of his 
fraudulent checks[,] . . . expectation is not synonymous with 
intent when a criminal does not know what he may expect to 
obtain, but intends to take what he can.” Id. at 193.  
 
To the contrary, focusing on Geevers’s argument 
regarding intent, the Court held that “a reasonable inference 
may be drawn that a defendant in Geevers’s position intends 
to cause the full loss of the face value of his false checks.” Id. 
at 192. Based on that reasonable inference, “the government 
has made its prima facie case,” and under our burden-shifting 
framework, the defendant “is free to come forward with 
evidence to demonstrate that he actually intended something 
less.” Id. at 193. Still the Geevers Court cautioned sentencing 
courts that “the face value of the deposited checks is not to be 
mechanically assumed to be the intended loss.” Id. at 194. 
Furthermore, even after determining the intended loss 
amount, district courts must consider whether the loss amount 
properly accounts for the seriousness of the offense and if not, 
whether to depart downward or upward. “[I]f any such 
augmentation caused the properly calculated ‘loss’ to 
overstate the seriousness of the offense,” then the district 
court may depart downward. Kopp, 951 F.2d at 523. 
“Correspondingly, if the court finds that the ‘loss’ understates 
the seriousness of the offense (which might be the case if 
actual and intended loss were zero and the risk of loss were 
significant), it may depart upward . . . .” Id.  
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In United States v. Titchell, 261 F.3d 348, 353-54 (3d 
Cir. 2001), we reinforced the Geevers requirement that 
district courts must conduct a “deeper analysis” before 
drawing the inference that a defendant intended to cause the 
full potential loss. In Titchell, the defendant had been 
convicted of mail fraud after mailing out fictitious invoices 
totaling $17,577,525 for the renewal of Yellow Pages 
advertising. Id. at 352. The defendant made at least $647,000 
from this scheme. Id. At sentencing, the entirety of the district 
court’s analysis was: “In this case the bulk mailing did (sic) 
defendant was found guilty of contained 119,575 bogus 
renewal invoices at a quote of $147 a piece. Thus, intended 
loss was $17,577,525. Therefore, the increase is warranted 
and the base offense level is increased to 21.” Id. at 353 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). 
On appeal, we found that the district court’s mere reference to 
the potential loss calculation, without any “attempt to explain 
or justify why the potential loss . . . should be considered to 
be the same as the intended loss,” constituted error. Id. at 
353-54. We reproached the government for its argument that 
district courts can implicitly draw reasonable inferences that a 
defendant intended to cause the full potential loss, noting, “if 
district courts could silently draw such inferences, there 
would be little left of Geevers’ admonition that district courts 
must perform a ‘deeper analysis’ than simply calculating 
potential loss.” Id. at 354. Here, we must determine whether 
the District Court performed the requisite “deeper analysis” in 
calculating Diallo’s loss amount.  
 
B. 
 
At Diallo’s sentencing, a Secret Service agent testified 
that he and his colleagues had contacted each financial 
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institution to determine the credit limit for each account 
number that Diallo had possessed and that the aggregate 
credit limit totaled $1.6 million. Only $160,000 in fraudulent 
activity could be attributed to Diallo. The agent also testified 
that an individual in possession of a stolen card would not be 
able to determine the credit limit without a subpoena to the 
financial institution. Finally, the agent testified that Diallo 
possessed a skimming device, which copies, stores, and 
encodes credit card information, and that Diallo was 
perpetrating his scheme at Wegmans stores from Virginia to 
New York.  
 
The United States probation officer who prepared 
Diallo’s presentence investigation report relied on the Secret 
Service’s determination that “[b]ased on the credit limit of 
each card, the intended loss amount was more than 
$1,600,000 but less than $2,500,000” and added 16 levels 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I). Confidential 
Presentence Report (“PSR”) ¶¶ 13, 20. The defense objected 
to the 16-level enhancement at sentencing, arguing that Diallo 
did not have “that type of guilty knowledge as to the amount 
that was available on these cards.” App. 24. The defense cited 
case law from outside of this Circuit in support of its view 
that “intended loss requires knowledge that the loss is virtual 
certainty,” which is not present in this case. Id. The 
Government responded that “If you can take someone’s credit 
card, and you can charge up to $20,000 on it, that’s the 
intended loss. That is how much you can get if you try long 
and hard enough to get it.” App. 25. The District Court, with 
no analysis, overruled Diallo’s objection to the intended loss 
enhancement. Diallo then argued for a downward departure, 
stating that as the intended loss calculation is ten times the 
actual loss, “the intended loss is really a gross overstatement 
14 
 
of the seriousness of this offense.” App. 28. In sentencing 
Diallo, the entirety of the District Court’s analysis on the 
intended loss amount was as follows: “The intended loss for 
credit cards he personally used and the cards he manufactured 
and provided to others totaled $1.6 million.” App. 30-31.  
 
In this case, as in Titchell, the District Court did not 
heed our warning that “it is error for a district court simply to 
equate [potential loss and intended loss] without ‘deeper 
analysis.’” Titchell, 261 F.3d at 354 (citing Geevers, 226 F.3d 
at 192). Here, there was no “deeper analysis” by the District 
Court as to whether Diallo intended the maximum potential 
loss by “maxing out” each and every credit card number that 
he fraudulently possessed. It is possible that the District Court 
relied on the Secret Service agent’s testimony that the search 
of his car uncovered a skimming device; the evidence that 
Diallo has traveled from Virginia to New York in order to use 
the fraudulent credit cards; that Diallo had already spent 
$160,000 and was continuing to make additional purchases; 
or that at the time of his arrest, Diallo had returned to a store 
where he had made $2,600 in purchases just one day prior. It 
is also conceivable that the District Court agreed with the 
Government’s argument that Diallo intended to charge up to 
the credit limit on every credit card number found in his 
possession. On the other hand, the District Court might 
simply have incorrectly presumed that the aggregate credit 
limit alone can make out a prima facie case for intended loss 
amount in a credit card fraud. Given that the District Court 
sentenced Diallo to 70 months, the bottom of his 70-to-87-
months Guidelines range, perhaps the District Court accepted 
the defense’s argument that the intended loss amount grossly 
overstated the seriousness of Diallo’s conduct. But from the 
District Court’s statement at sentencing—“The intended loss 
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for credit cards he personally used and the cards he 
manufactured and provided to others totaled $1.6 million” 
App. 30-31—we would be speculating as to what evidence or 
argument was the basis for the District Court’s finding that 
$1.6 million was Diallo’s intended loss amount. This type of 
“speculation ‘is inappropriate’ in light of the inherently 
discretionary nature of the sentencing court’s decision.” 
United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(citing United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 89-90 (3d Cir. 
1992)). 
 
C. 
 
We cannot say as a matter of law that the District 
Court’s error was harmless. The possibility exists that the 
District Court, on remand, may find that the Government fails 
to prove by preponderance of the evidence that Diallo 
intended to use each and every fraudulent credit card until the 
entire $1.6 million aggregate credit limit was depleted. If so, 
it may find that the actual loss of $160,000 is a more 
reasonable estimate of loss. Based on that loss amount, the 
District Court would increase the offense level by ten, rather 
than sixteen, resulting in a total offense level of 21 instead of 
27, leading to a Guidelines range of 37 to 46 months’ 
imprisonment. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A.2
 
 Of course, on remand, 
the District Court may also better justify its conclusion that 
Diallo intended to commit the maximum potential loss.  
                                              
2 This Guidelines range does not incorporate the additional 
reduction that would occur on remand based on the number-
of-victims enhancement.  
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Thus, we must remand to the District Court to 
determine the intended loss amount and whether a departure 
is warranted based on the intended loss amount overstating or 
understating the seriousness of the offense. See United States 
v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205, 217 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e cannot 
presume that a district court would have imposed the same 
sentence, given the opportunity to consider the correctly 
calculated Guideline.”). 
 
III. 
 
Accordingly, the Judgment of Sentence of the District 
Court entered on September 7, 2010 will be vacated and the 
case remanded for resentencing in conformity with this 
opinion.  
